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1. Genealogical Scepticism 
 
In Aristophanes’ The Clouds, Socrates orders his hapless student Strepsiades to 
lie down on a couch to make him more receptive to philosophical inspiration. 
Instead he catches Strepsiades masturbating under the bedclothes. Aristophanes’ 
suggestion is that it amounts to much the same thing. Like philosophy, 
scepticism about philosophy has its modes and fashions. Sometimes the 
accusation, as with Aristophanes, is that a seemingly lofty activity is in fact 
chicanery, nonsense in the service of all too human desire. According to the sort 
of diagnostic scepticism associated with the later Wittgenstein, philosophy is a 
symptom of pathology or confusion. Scientistic scepticism impugns philosophy 
for falling short of some putative standard met by all respectable – that is, 
empirical – modes of enquiry. What we might call ‘genealogical’ scepticism 
complains that the building blocks of philosophy – the judgments and concepts 
on which it all hangs – are contingent features of whoever it is who is doing the 
philosophising: her or his particular history, culture, language, education, 
gender, character. 
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Coming to terms with the genealogical contingency of thought has been a 
preoccupation of the European intellectual tradition since the mid-18th century. 
German historicists like Herder and Humboldt taught Europeans to think 
historically about thought itself, to see historical inquiry as a historically 
circumscribed endeavour rather than an unencumbered encounter with the hard 
facts of the past. Hegel applied this historicist lesson to philosophy: as “each 
child is in any case a child of his time…thus, philosophy, too, is its own time 
comprehended in thoughts” (1820/1991, 21). In turn, German historicism lay the 
groundwork for Nietzsche, from whom we have the term ‘genealogy’ in the 
sense in which I’ve been using it – as applying not to people but to beliefs, values 
and concepts – as well as the most famous example of a sceptical genealogy: the 
genealogy of bourgeois, Christian morality we find in On the Genealogy of 
Morals.1,2 Here Nietzsche tells us that our system of morality has its true origins 
not in human goodness or divine providence, but in an interplay of more lowly 
forces: the ressentiment of slaves against their masters, the debtor-creditor 
relation, and the desire of the priestly caste to dominate. In Nietzsche we see the 
fulfilment of what Robert Brandom calls the “revenge of Enlightenment 
naturalism on Enlightenment rationalism” (m.s. 3). That is, Nietzsche’s 
genealogy showed how the kind of scientific, naturalised explanation that was 
the hallmark of the Enlightenment could be used to undermine the great idol of 
the Enlightenment, man’s capacity for rational thought. 
 
                                                     
1 I don’t mean to suggest that Nietzsche was the first to think this way. Bernard Williams argues 
that in Book 2 of Republic, Plato has Socrates reject the genealogical accounts of justice put 
forward by Glaucon and Adeimantus because he thinks they would undermine the intrinsic value 
of justice (Williams 2002). And we of course see similar sceptical tendencies in Hobbes’, Hume’s 
and Toland’s writings on religion. Xenophanes of Kolophon is perhaps the most amusing early 
example of genealogical unmasking: 
Mortals suppose that the gods are born (as they themselves are), and that they wear 
man’s clothing and have human voice and body. But if cattle or lions had hands, so as 
to paint with their hands and produce works of art as men do, they would paint their 
gods and give them bodies in form like their own—horses like horses, cattle like 
cattle (1898, fragments 5-6). 
2 Though Nietzsche, ever elusive, also wrote: “The origin becomes of less significance in 
proportion as we acquire insight into it; whilst things nearest to ourselves, around and within us, 
gradually begin to manifest their wealth of colours, beauties, enigmas, and diversity of meaning, 
of which earlier humanity never dreamed” (1881/1911 I:44). 
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In the 20th and 21st centuries, sceptical genealogies have taken a variety of 
forms: French historical epistemology as practiced by Bachelard, Canguilhem, 
and most famously Foucault; feminist and subaltern unmasking of patriarchal 
and imperialist ideologies; psychoanalytic diagnoses of everything from 
architectural forms to Zionism. Indeed much of the intellectual history of the 
20th century might be told in terms of a war between those committed to 
historicist or naturalistic genealogical excavation and those, like Karl Popper 
and Leo Strauss, who thought such excavation not just alethically irrelevant but 
ethically pernicious. Indeed one might think – or at least I think – that the ‘two 
cultures’ of the modern intellectual world are no longer, as C.P. Snow once 
suggested, the humanities and the sciences, but rather those on one hand who 
think that everything must be genealogised, and on the other, those who think 
that there is nothing to be learned from genealogy. 
 
For most of its short history analytic philosophy has been on the side that thinks 
there not much point to revelations of genealogical contingency. After all, we 
believe everything we do because of contingent facts about ourselves: that we 
exist at all, that we were born where and when we were, that we received the 
education we did, that we formed the concepts that are required to entertain 
certain propositions. The mere fact that a belief or practice (philosophy included) 
has a contingent origin does not entail that it is false or unjustified; to think 
otherwise is to commit the genetic fallacy. But things are shifting. Genealogical 
scepticism about philosophy, or at least one or more of its domains, is 
increasingly common amongst philosophers. Many contemporary ethicists claim 
that the evolutionary origins of our moral judgments demand that we abandon 
or revise those judgments – or at least adopt an anti-realist construal of their 
contents (Harman 1977, 1986; Singer 1981, 2005; Ruse 1985; Ruse and Wilson 
1986; Gibbard 1990; Kitcher 2005, 2011; Joyce 2006, ch. 6; Street 2006, 2008, 
2011; Greene 2008; Huemer 2008; Rosenberg 2011.)3 James Ladyman and Don 
Ross (2007) argue that the evolutionary origins of our metaphysical judgments 
                                                     
3 With the same logic but in a different spirit, Thomas Nagel (2012) infers from what he takes to 
be the incompatibility of an evolutionary account of moral judgment with moral realism that the 
evolutionary explanation must be false. 
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should make us suspicious of their reliability. Genealogically-motivated 
arguments have also been launched against realism in math (Benacerraf 1973; 
Field 1989) and logic (Cooper 2003), theism (Dennett 2006)4 and naturalism 
(Plantinga 1993, ch. 12, 1994, 2002). And the new sub-discipline of ‘experimental 
philosophy’ is in part devoted to arguing that people’s judgments about 
epistemology, ethics, philosophy of language and metaphysics systematically 
vary with culture, gender, socioeconomic status and extent of philosophical 
training – and thus that these judgments should be cleansed from philosophical 
practice (for an overview, see Knobe and Nichols 2008, 2014; and Alexander 
2012).5,6  
 
What should we make of such genealogical scepticism about philosophical 
judgment? No doubt many find it intuitively compelling. Joshua Knobe and 
Shaun Nichols predict that encountering the results of experimental philosophy 
will cause in philosophers a 
 
…crisis akin to that of the [Christian] child confronted with religious 
diversity…For the discovery of religious diversity can prompt the 
thought that it’s in some sense accidental that one happens to be 
raised in a Christian household rather than a Hindu household. This 
kind of arbitrariness can make the child wonder whether there’s any 
reason to think that his religious beliefs are more likely to be right 
than those of the Hindu child…And just as some Christian children 
come to think that there’s no rational basis for preferring Christian to 
                                                     
4 Genealogical attacks on theism have a particularly storied pedigree. See Feuerbach 1841; Marx 
1844; Nietzsche 1887; Freud 1927. 
5 Not all of experimental philosophy participates in this sceptical project; much of it is focused on 
using empirical methods to address first-order philosophical issues, usually in philosophy of mind 
and action and moral psychology. Jesse Prinz (2008) suggests using the term ‘empirical 
philosophy’ for this non-sceptical part of experimental philosophy, and reserving the label 
‘experimental philosophy’ for the empirically-driven critique of philosophical judgment. I will 
follow Prinz in his use of the terms ‘experimental philosophy’ and ‘experimental philosophers’. 
6 A related topic is the much discussed issue of peer disagreement. Proponents of so-called 
‘conciliatory’ or ‘split-the-difference’ views on peer disagreement sometimes suggest that peer 
disagreement constitutes some sort of genealogical evidence: specifically, evidence about the 
unreliability of one’s belief-forming mechanism. But not all discussions of peer disagreement 
treat it as an issue about genealogy. So for the most part I set it aside. See my paper with John 
Hawthorne (2013) for a discussion of the disagreement debate. 
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Hindu beliefs, we too might come to think that there’s no rational 
basis for preferring Western philosophical notions to Eastern ones 
(2008, 11). 
 
As a descriptive matter, Knobe and Nichols might well be right. (Indeed we need 
not imagine some hypothetical encounter with experimental philosophy. Anyone 
who has taught a first-year undergraduate philosophy course will likely be 
familiar with this sort of sceptical response.) But the tacit normative claim here – 
that philosophers ought to experience such a crisis of faith – is far more vexed. 
Not every crisis is rational. And not every revelation of genealogical contingency 
undermines judgment. My judgment that Paris is the capital of France is 
contingent on the fact that I exist, that I possess the concepts Paris and France, 
and that I have been taught that the capital of France is Paris. And yet none of 
these revelations of genealogical contingency seem to undermine my claim to 
know that Paris is the capital of France. If they do, we have entered a realm of 
wholesale scepticism, in which none of my judgments are secure. Such wholesale 
scepticism is presumably not to the taste of most genealogical sceptics. After all, 
their scepticism appears to be based on facts that they take themselves to know – 
namely, that our philosophical judgments have the particular genealogies (in 
evolutionary history, or culture, or education) they do (cf. Bealer 1992; Foley 
1998; Sosa 1998, 2005; Tidman 1996; Yablo 1993). Such sceptics must do more 
than merely reveal that our philosophical judgments are genealogically 
contingent. They must show us why the kind of genealogical contingency 
exhibited by (some or all) philosophical judgments should cause a crisis of faith, 
without thereby debunking all claims to knowledge, especially their own. 
 
Epistemologists have written about the difficulty of finding a plausible 
epistemological principle that can vindicate genealogical scepticism while 
avoiding global scepticism (Srinivasan 2009,  White 2010; cf. Elga m.s., Vavova 
m.s. and Schechter m.s.). In §2 I rehearse the reasons for so thinking, with the 
hope of bringing out an overlooked dimension of this debate: namely, that any 
plausible argument for genealogical scepticism rests on contested first-order 
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epistemological premises – premises that some philosophers find intuitively 
attractive while others do not.7 This is despite the claim, made by some 
genealogical sceptics, to take an Archimedean view of philosophy, one that 
inhabits the philosophically neutral perspectives of sociology, history, science or 
commonsense.8 Unfortunately no such Archimedean stance is available. To 
argue against philosophy on the grounds of genealogical contingency requires 
taking a stance within epistemology, and thus within philosophy itself. And, as 
genealogical sceptics themselves are keen to point out, which stances people take 
within philosophy (including epistemology) is in part a matter of genealogical 
contingency. One’s judgments about the epistemological premises required by 
any plausible argument for genealogical scepticism --  judgments about 
explanation, evidence, justification, defeat, methods, bootstrapping and so on – 
are presumably as shaped by background factors (one’s culture, or the nature of 
extent of one’s philosophical training) as the philosophical judgments that 
genealogical sceptics wish to impugn. If so, then genealogical scepticism faces 
the spectre of self-defeat. The genealogical sceptic cannot, by his own lights, 
have reason to accept his argument’s conclusion – and nor can he offer us any 
reason for accepting it, either. Or so I will argue in §2. 
 
In §3 I ask: where does this leave us? Many have argued that once we note that 
there is no epistemologically plausible argument for genealogical scepticism, our 
work is done. And my point about self-defeat might seem to put a final nail in the 
coffin: even if we could find an epistemologically plausible argument for 
                                                     
7 Knobe and Nichols’ analogy between the genealogical contingency of religious belief and the 
genealogical contingency of philosophical judgments is apt, but not for the reasons they suppose. 
Over two decades of philosophical debate about the rationality of religious exclusivism – whether 
one ought to have a ‘crisis of faith’ in light of the genealogical contingency of one’s religious belief 
– reveal just how subtle the epistemological issues in play are. See e.g. Smith 1976; Hick 1980, 
1982, 1989, 2001; Gutting 1982; Plantinga 1986, 1993, 1995, 2000; Alston 1988a; Runzo 1988; 
Silver 2001; Willard 2001. 
8 The philosophical use of the metaphor of the Archimedean lever – about which, Archimedes 
(according to Pappus of Alexandria) famously said, “Give me a place to stand, and I will move the 
Earth” – has a long history. See for example Descartes 1641/1993, 17; Arendt 1958, VI. 36; 
Rawls 1971, 261; Berlin 1979, 114–15; Williams 1985, ch. 2; Dworkin 1996. Thanks largely to 
Dworkin, the notion of ‘Archimedeanism’ in philosophy is now usually taken to indicate a 
particular view in moral philosophy, namely that a meaningful distinction can be drawn between 
first-order normative claims and meta-ethical claims. I mean to use the notion in a broader way. 
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genealogical scepticism, that argument would at best be thought plausible only 
by some – those who share some particular genealogy – and thus would be self-
defeating. But I myself don’t share the view that genealogical scepticism can be 
so easily dismissed. Just because the genealogical sceptic can offer us no reason, 
by his own lights, to accept his conclusion, doesn’t entail that his conclusion is 
false. Moreover, there is the serious risk that the genealogical sceptic’s argument 
is a successful ad hominem attack, showing us how our own epistemological 
framework undermines itself from within. The worry is that it is by our own 
lights that our philosophical judgments are impugned. What we need is stable 
ground: a positive picture of what knowledge requires, and we’re doing when we 
do philosophy, that resistant to genealogical scepticism. I will end this paper 
with some thoughts on what such a picture might amount to. 
 
2. Arguments for Genealogical Scepticism 
 
I now turn to the task of laying out possible arguments for genealogical 
scepticism, with the hope of showing why, plausibly, they are self-defeating. I 
will discuss five arguments: the argument from insensitivity, the argument from 
explanatory inertness, the argument from coincidence, the argument from 
probability on the evidence, and the argument from unreliability. I don’t mean 
the discussion here to be exhaustive. I mean merely to draw out the contentious 
epistemological premises that are involved in the most plausible or common 
arguments for genealogical scepticism; I take it that a similar trick can be 
performed for further variations on the same argumentative theme. 
 
Two brief notes. For the sake of convenience I lay out these arguments as if they 
are attacks on philosophical judgment in general, although genealogical sceptics 
typically concede that some (or many) domains of philosophical judgment are 
immune from sceptical attack. Also for convenience I focus primarily on 
genealogical scepticism that is motivated by findings of cultural variation, 
though what I say can be easily extended to genealogical scepticism that is 
motivated instead by evolutionary, psychological or historical contingency. 
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 2.1 Insensitivity 
 
To simplify matters, let us suppose that you belong to a particular group – let’s 
call it ‘Westerners’ – the members of which share all the same philosophical 
judgments. Meanwhile, the members of a distinct group – ‘Easterners’ – share all 
the opposing philosophical judgments. For example, you and all your fellow 
Westerners share the judgment that Gettier’s Jones doesn’t know, while 
Easterners all share the judgment that Jones does know.9 And you and your 
fellow Westerners share Kripkean judgments about reference while Easterners 
share non-Kripkean judgments.10 And so on. It follows that for each 
philosophical judgment, one group is right and the other wrong.11 Now suppose 
a sceptic argues as follows: “Take any one of your philosophical judgments, for 
example your judgment that Gettier’s Jones doesn’t know. The empirical 
evidence shows that people’s judgments about Gettier cases are caused by their 
cultural upbringing rather than by the truth about those cases. This means that 
even if Jones did know (holding the other facts of the Gettier case fixed), you 
would still believe he didn’t know!” The sceptic is in effect arguing that your 
Gettier judgment is insensitive to the truth, where S’s judgment that p is sensitive 
just in case, if p were false, S wouldn’t believe p, and thus that your judgment 
doesn’t constitute knowledge.12,13 Here is a generalisation of the argument: 
                                                     
9 This is an exaggerated version of the result claimed by Weinberg, Nichols and Stich 2003. For 
a critical discussion of those results, see Nagel, J. 2012. For a more recent and comprehensive 
empirical study that suggests that the Gettier intuition is in fact cross-culturally robust, see 
Machery et al (forthcoming). 
10 This is an exaggerated version of the result claimed by Machery et al. 2004. 
11 I’m assuming a realist construal of the subject matter of philosophical judgment, rather than a 
view on which philosophy involves mere conceptual analysis. (Of course one might be a realist 
and think that conceptual analysis is sometimes a useful means towards understanding, e.g. 
knowledge itself.) I’m also assuming that every philosophical proposition – or at least the ones 
believed by Westerners and Easterners – is either true or false. 
12 To avoid spurious counterexamples, sensitivity is usually relativised to methods. I’ll ignore 
this complication here. 
13 Another complication: applying a sensitivity condition to philosophical judgments involves 
evaluating counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents, since (presumably) the propositions 
that are the typical contents of philosophical judgments are, if true, necessarily true. Thus, on a 
standard treatment of counterfactuals, sensitivity will be vacuously satisfied for all true 
philosophical judgments (Lewis 1973, 24-5.) If so, then even if sensitivity is a genuine condition 
on knowledge, the following argument will not be sound (cf. Nozick 1981, 322, 342ff). I ignore 
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 Argument from Insensitivity (AI) 
(1) Your philosophical judgments are insensitive to the truth 
(2) Sensitivity is a condition on knowledge 
(3) Therefore, your philosophical judgments don’t constitute knowledge  
 
(AI) certainly enjoys a prima facie appeal, at least for some suitable refinement of 
‘philosophical judgments’.14 Nonetheless, many will reject (AI) on the grounds 
that (2) has unacceptable sceptical consequences. Take my belief that I am not a 
handless-brain-in-a-vat. If I were a handless-brain-in-a-vat, I would still believe 
that I wasn’t a handless-brain-in-a-vat. So my belief that I’m not a handless-
brain-in-a-vat is insensitive to the truth of the belief. If (2) is true, then I do not 
know that I am not a handless-brain-in-a-vat. If closure holds,15 then it is also 
follows that I do not know that I have hands – or indeed very much else. 
 
What’s the upshot? First, those philosophers who already reject sensitivity as a 
condition on knowledge will presumably be left cold by (AI); insofar as 
genealogical scepticism is just a version of traditional wholesale scepticism, most 
philosophers will take themselves to have good independent reason reject it. 
Second, genealogical sceptics themselves have reason to reject sensitivity, and 
thus (AI), insofar as they themselves are not global sceptics.16 Third, as an 
empirical matter, it’s plausible that judgments about sensitivity are themselves 
genealogically contingent in a way that makes them susceptible to (AI). Indeed, 
                                                                                                                                                 
this complication here, granting for the sake of argument that our philosophical judgments are 
indeed insensitive. 
14 For versions of (AI) directed against moral realism see Blackburn 1985, 16-18 and Williams 
1985, 143, 151. Susan Hurley puts forward what she takes to be the best version of the 
evolutionary debunking argument against moral knowledge along sensitivity lines, though she 
ultimately endorses a non-sensitivity theory of epistemic justification (1989, ch. 14).  
15 Specifically, single-premise closure under known implication, viz. if I know p, and I know that 
p entails q, then I know q. 
16 Assuming they do not wish to reject closure. That said, it’s not entirely clear what it would 
look like to accept sensitivity but deny closure for philosophical knowledge, as Nozick would 
have us do for empirical propositions. Perhaps it would turn out that we could not know general 
propositions like descriptivism about reference is false but we could know more specific propositions 
like ‘Gödel’ doesn’t refer to Schmidt – the idea being that the closest world in which ‘Gödel’ doesn’t 
refer to Schmidt’ is false is, e.g., a world in which Gödel and Schmidt are the same person. 
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according to Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2003), Westerners are more likely 
than South Asians to accept traditional, brain-in-a-vat style arguments.17 Thus 
insofar as a Westerner finds herself inclined to accept (AI) she might worry that 
her judgment that (2) is true is itself insensitive, tracking not the truth of its 
content but rather just the contingencies of her upbringing. If so, then (AI) 
impugns commitment to its own premises. 
 
 2.2 Explanatory Inertness 
 
A second form of genealogical scepticism focuses on the supposed explanatory 
inertness of the (putative) truth of our philosophical judgments. According to this 
line of argument, our philosophical judgments are entirely explained by 
genealogies that make no mention of their truth; this in turn implies that we 
have no reason to believe that our philosophical judgments are correct. Take 
again our simplified case, in which you and your fellow Westerners share some 
philosophical judgment p while Easterners share the judgment not-p. We might 
think that the complete explanation of why you believe p rather than not-p is 
that you were born a Westerner rather than an Easterner. Contrast the complete 
explanation of why I believe there is a computer in front of me. Presumably that 
explanation will involve the fact that there is a computer in front of me, causing 
me to have certain visual sensations that in turn lead to the formation of my 
computer-belief. So unlike the explanation of your judgment that p, the 
explanation of my computer-judgment mentions the truth of that judgment. 
Here is a generalisation of the argument: 
 
 Argument from Explanatory Inertness (AEI) 
                                                     
17 In addition, the PhilStudies Survey (www.philpapers.org/surveys) has a wealth of information 
about the correlations between level of philosophical training and views on external world 
scepticism. The general tendency seems to be that the more philosophical training one has, the 
less likely one is to be an external world sceptic (22.6% of undergraduates say they lean toward 
or accept external world scepticism, while only 8.0% of graduates and 7.1% of faculty 
members/those with PhD’s say the same). Within the group of faculty members/ PhD’s, those 
who specialise in epistemology tend to have a higher than average acceptance of external world 
scepticism: 10.4%. Of those faculty members/PhD’s who specialise in Continental philosophy, 
11.4% lean toward or accept external world scepticism. 
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(7) Your philosophical judgments can be explained without 
mention of their putative truth 
(8) When a judgment can be explained without mention of its 
(putative) truth, then that judgment is unjustified 
(9) Therefore, your philosophical judgments are unjustified 
 
Many have found (AEI) attractive, especially when ‘philosophical judgments’ is 
restricted to ethical judgments (Harman 1977, Joyce 2006; cf. Street 2006, 114). 
As Harman writes: “Moral hypotheses do not help explain why people [make the 
moral judgments they do]. So ethics is problematic and nihilism must be taken 
seriously” (ibid., 11). (AEI) might be thought similarly compelling when applied 
to non-ethical philosophical judgments. The complete explanation of why you or 
I have the epistemological, metaphysical, aesthetic etc. judgments we do – in the 
terms of evolutionary psychology, or neuroscience, or sociology – will, we might 
suppose, make no mention of the truth of those judgments. So it turns out that 
epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics and so on are problematic, and nihilism 
about those domains is to be taken seriously. 
 
What should we make of (AEI)? (7) will naturally come under pressure for any 
domain of philosophical judgment whose content is thought to be causally 
connected to judgments in that domain. Ethical naturalists, for example, identify 
moral properties (e.g. goodness) with causally efficacious non-moral properties 
(e.g. being conducive to human welfare). This identity secures, in turn, the causal 
efficacy of the moral properties. So, assuming ethical naturalism, it is possible 
that the complete causal explanation of my moral judgments does in fact 
mention the moral truths. To claim, as Harman does, that the complete 
explanation of our moral judgments doesn’t actually feature moral facts might be 
thought to beg the question against the ethical naturalist.18 Take again my 
judgment that there is a computer in front of me. A sceptic about my computer 
                                                     
18 Richard Joyce argues that Harman’s point is not that there are no moral facts, but more subtly, 
that if there is no naturalistic reduction of moral facts, then there are none (2006, 184-5). Thus 
Joyce’s own version of the explanatory inertness argument involves a putative refutation of 
ethical naturalism. I will take the standard line on Harman – that is, that he offers an argument 
for moral nihilism. My apologies if this turns out to be a misrepresentation. 
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judgment might argue as follows: “You believe there’s a computer in front of you 
just because of a particular configuration of your brain states that makes it seem 
to you that you are having the visual impression of a computer. This explanation 
makes no mention of the putative fact that there really is a computer in front of 
you. Therefore you are unjustified in believing that there is a computer in front 
of you.”19  Harman might protest the analogy. He might argue that this is simply 
not the complete explanation of my judgment that there is a computer in front of 
me, for there is in fact a causal connection between there being a computer in 
front me and my judgment that there is. But to assume, as Harman does, that a 
similar protest might not be launched against his scepticism about moral 
judgment is to beg the question against the ethical naturalist. For if there is an 
appropriate causal connection between my moral judgments and the moral 
truths, then the complete explanation of my moral judgments will feature the 
truth of those judgments. 
 
We can generalise this dialectical observation. Insofar as one thinks that the 
philosophical domain under sceptical pressure is causally active, one will deny 
that it is explanatorily inert – and thus will think that judgments in that domain 
can be robust against (AEI). For example, those who think that there exists a 
strong continuity between metaphysics or philosophy of mind and the natural 
sciences (and who are realists about the natural sciences) will likely think that 
the truth of their judgments in those philosophical domains should be explained 
in ways not dissimilar to explanations of true scientific judgments.20 
 
That said, many philosophers are realists about domains of philosophical 
judgment that they think causally inert. Many are realists about ethics, 
epistemology and math without thinking that ethical, epistemic and 
mathematical properties are causally efficacious. Nonetheless, such philosophers 
might deny that judgments in these domains are undermined by (AEI). They 
                                                     
19 A different form of explanatory scepticism about computers might take its cue from the 
merelogical nihilism of Trenton Merricks (2001) or Ted Sider (2014). 
20 For discussions of the extent to which metaphysics really is continuous with the natural 
sciences, see Ladyman and Ross 2007; Chalmers, Manley and Wasserman 2009; Dorr 2010. 
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might object that the notion of explanation presupposed by (AEI) – that is, causal 
explanation – is needlessly narrow.21 To offer a single example, suppose one 
thinks, along with Timothy Williamson  (2000), that knowledge is explanatorily 
basic. Then, if our philosophical judgments are instances of knowledge, any 
putative explanation of them that does not explain why they are true will a 
fortiori fail to be an adequate explanation. Thus a purely psychological 
explanation might constitute an adequate explanation of why the brain-in-a-vat 
believes he has hands, but will not constitute an adequate explanation of why I, 
as an unenvatted creature, believe I have hands. Similarly, if our philosophical 
judgments are false, then an adequate explanation of them will naturally not 
mention their truth; but if our philosophical judgments are items of knowledge, 
then an adequate explanation of them must. Even without supposing a causal 
relationship between the contents of our philosophical judgments and those 
judgments, some might take themselves to have reason to deny (7). 
 
I don’t mean to be taking a view on which domains of philosophical judgment are 
causal or whether it’s ever correct to explain our philosophical judgments in 
non-causal terms. Rather, my point is simply this. Whether (AEI) is sound turns 
on contentious issues in epistemology as well as metaphysics: which properties 
are causal, what constitutes a good explanation, which things are explanatorily 
basic. If our philosophical judgments about these questions can be explained 
without mentioning their truth – as presumably the genealogical sceptic would 
think they can, on pain of inconsistency – then it seems that (AEI) implies that 
we wouldn’t be justified in accepting a crucial premise of (AEI).22 
 
 2.3  Coincidence 
                    
A third argument for genealogical scepticism appeals to the supposed difficulty 
of providing an explanation of how our philosophical judgments, given their 
particular genealogy, reliably track the truth. Though related, this argument is 
                                                     
21 On the limitations of narrowly causal notions of explanation, see Nerlich 1979; Sober 1983; 
Woodward 2003, 220–22; Lipton 2004, 9–10. 
22 For similar arguments against explanatory inertness scepticism, cf. Pust 2001 and Cuneo 2007. 
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distinct from the one discussed in the §2.2. There the argument presupposed that 
we could explain our philosophical judgments without mention of their truth. 
The present argument instead relies on the distinct premise that there is no 
plausible explanation of how our philosophical judgments reliably get onto the 
truth: that the putative correlation between our philosophical judgments and the 
philosophical truths is a mere coincidence. One might deny the former while 
accepting the latter. For one might think that proximate explanations of 
particular philosophical judgments must include reference to the philosophical 
facts, but meanwhile deny that there exists a general explanation for how my 
philosophical judgments reliably track the truth.23 
 
Coincidence arguments are popular among genealogical sceptics. For example, 
Ladyman and Ross claim that we have no reason to think that our metaphysical 
judgments are reliable given that “proficiency in inferring the large-scale and 
small-scale structure of our immediate environment, or any features of parts of 
the universe distant from our ancestral stomping grounds, was of no relevance to 
our ancestors’ reproductive fitness” (2007, 2). Similarly, Sharon Street argues 
that since metanormative realism would require us to accept that our normative 
judgments coincidentally track the mind-independent normative truths, it must 
be rejected (2006). And  Hartry Field offers a similar argument against a realist 
construal of mathematical knowledge (1989, 2005). Here’s a generalisation of the 
argument: 
 
 Argument from Coincidence (AC) 
(10) There is no plausible explanation of how our philosophical 
judgments reliably track the truth 
(11) If there is no plausible explanation of how judgments in a 
domain track the truth in that domain, then those judgments are 
unjustified 
                                                     
23 Only someone who endorsed a non-causal view of the relevant domain of philosophical 
judgment would be likely to say this. For someone with a causal view will presumably claim both 
that individual judgments are best explained with reference to their truth and that the reliability 
of judgments in the domain as a whole can be explained causally. 
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(12) Our philosophical judgments are unjustified 
 
This argument can be interpreted depending on how the ambiguity in ‘our’ 
philosophical judgments is resolved. When the philosophical judgments under 
attack are those shared by humans in general – our broad-brush epistemic, moral 
or metaphysical judgments – then the motivation for (10) will be that, in light of 
the evolutionary origins of our philosophical judgments, there is no plausible 
explanation of how they reliably track the truth. When the philosophical 
judgments under attack are those shared by a particular group – e.g. analytic 
philosophers, or Westerners – then the motivation for (10) will be that, in light of 
the group-specific origins of our philosophical judgments, there is no plausible 
explanation of how they reliably track the truth. 
  
Again, those who think that philosophical judgments are caused by the 
philosophical truths won’t have much truck with (10). But what about everyone 
else? Must they accept that there is no plausible explanation for how 
philosophical judgments reliably track the truth, in light of their evolutionarily 
or culturally contingent origins? Suppose that the movement of a certain 
commodities market in the Netherlands is isomorphic to the daily rainfall in the 
Amazon basin. What might explain the coordination? One possible explanation 
is causal: the exchange of the commodity affects the rainfall in the Amazon, or 
the Amazonian rainfall affects the exchange of the commodity, or there exists 
some third factor that causally influences both. Here is an alternative 
explanation, one that doesn’t posit a causal connection underlying the 
correlation: both Amazonian rainfall and the Dutch commodity market are 
characterised by the same underlying mathematical structure. Thus their 
movements evince a striking isomorphism. Now consider a similar argument for 
the reliability of humanity’s moral judgments: the moral truths are generally 
oriented around the principle of achieving social harmony, and evolution selected 
for creatures who had moral beliefs that were conducive to social harmony. Or 
one for the reliability of our epistemological judgments: the epistemological 
truths are generally oriented around truth-conduciveness, and evolution selected 
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for creatures who are good at pursuing truth. Or one for the reliability of our 
mathematical and metaphysical judgments: the mathematical and metaphysical 
truths structure the way the world is, and evolution selected for creatures who 
were good at learning about the way the world is. 
 
Analogous defences could be put forward against (AC) interpreted as an attack 
on the judgments of some subset of the human population. Let’s suppose (AC) is 
run as an argument against the philosophical judgments of Westerners: given 
the cultural contingency of philosophical judgments, there is no plausible 
explanation for how Western philosophical judgments reliably track the truth 
while those of Easterners don’t. But now suppose we respond: the moral truths 
are generally oriented around human harmony, the epistemological truths 
around truth-conduciveness, and so on.…and Westerners have moral beliefs that 
are generally oriented around human harmony, epistemological beliefs that are 
oriented around truth-conduciveness, and so on. Thus the correlation is 
explained. 
 
The genealogical sceptic might respond that, apart from being culturally 
chauvinistic, this response simply passes the explanatory buck. For what is now 
to be explained is the coincidence that the philosophical truths are such that they 
coincide with, say, what happens to be favoured by human evolution or Western 
culture. Take again the case of the Dutch commodity market and the Amazonian 
rainfall. The sceptic might ask: what explains the (putative) fact that these two 
phenomena share the same mathematical structure? Isn’t that a coincidence? The 
anti-sceptic might respond: indeed it is, but there is in general no prohibition 
against believing in coincidences. Explanation, after all, must come to an end 
somewhere. 
 
Indeed, if the provision of explanation must eventually give out, then why might 
not someone reasonably deny premise (11) of (AC)? Why not simply admit that 
the correlation between our philosophical judgments and the philosophical 
truths is brute – a ‘massive coincidence’, if you like, but one no more remarkable 
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than the ‘massive coincidence’ that we’re not brains-in-vats? In some sense it’s 
just a matter of good luck – or at least the absence of rotten luck – that we live in 
a corner of possibility space where humans aren’t routinely envatted. And since 
this contingent unenvatted-ness allows us to know that we have hands, in a 
sense it’s just a matter of good luck – a happy coincidence – that we are able to 
know much at all. Why think that the cases that trouble the genealogical sceptic 
– the good luck of having evolutionary or cultural genealogies that are 
knowledge-conducive – are any different? 
 
No doubt the proponent of (AC) is uncomfortable with the idea that what we 
might call ‘genealogical luck’ could play such a central role in our capacity to 
know philosophical truths. But the extent to which luck influences our ability to 
know is itself a philosophical question, one on which there is little 
epistemological consensus.24 Thus (AC) turns on a set of questions about 
explanation, coincidence and luck on which epistemologists to systematically 
disagree, presumably because of various genealogical quirks. So (AC) is 
threatened with self-defeat. For if there exists no plausible explanation for how 
our philosophical judgments reliably get onto the truth, then this will 
presumably apply to our epistemological judgments as well, thus undermining 
commitment to (AC)’s own premises.25 
 
 2.4 Evidential Improbability 
 
A fourth sceptical strategy is to argue as follows: given the relevant genealogical 
evidence, it is improbable that our philosophical judgments are true. This 
argument again relies on the supposition that our philosophical judgments are 
not caused by the philosophical truths – a supposition rejected, as I already 
                                                     
24 For a discussion of how epistemologists diverge in their thinking about the role that luck plays 
in the acquisition of knowledge, see Zagzebski 1996 and Srinivasan 2015. 
25 Street (2006, n. 57) raises he worry that her debunking argument against moral realism is self-
defeating. Her defence seems to be that, given her metanormative anti-realism, we have reason to 
accept her argument because we will in fact share the same or sufficiently similar epistemological 
judgments about its soundness. Thus perhaps Street’s argument is best read as an ad hominem 
attack against those who are antecedently committed to the epistemological premises of her 
argument. I discuss how we should address the ad hominem possibility in §3. 
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mentioned, by some philosophers for some domains of philosophical judgment. 
But let’s suppose that our philosophical judgments are indeed not caused by the 
philosophical truths. Instead, let us suppose that they are entirely caused by 
some relevant genealogy. Take some philosophical judgment of mine – for 
example, that Gettier’s Jones doesn’t know. Let’s suppose that I believe this 
because it was adaptive for my evolutionary ancestors to believe this, or because 
I was taught it by my culture, or in my philosophy class. How probable is it that 
this judgment is true, given that, wherever my belief came from, it has no causal 
relationship to the (putative) fact that Jones doesn’t know? It seems that the 
odds are no better than 50-50. When I then generalise the question to a whole 
domain of judgments – say, all my epistemological judgments – the chance gets 
very small indeed. Thus the probability that all or even most of my philosophical 
judgments are true is vanishingly low. Here is a generalisation of the argument: 
 
 Argument from Probability on the Evidence (APE) 
(13) Conditional on the relevant genealogical evidence, it’s no more 
than 50% probable that any given one of one’s philosophical 
judgments is true 
(14) If it’s no more than 50% probable that one of one’s judgment is 
true conditional on the relevant genealogical evidence, then that 
judgment is unjustified 
(15) One’s philosophical judgments are unjustified 
 
As noted, those who are committed to a causal connection obtaining between a 
given domain of philosophical judgment and truths in that domain will want to 
take issue with (13). But those not so committed might dig their heels in at (14). 
Suppose for instance that I know  – as indeed I take myself to – that Gettier’s 
Jones doesn’t know. And let us suppose, as some epistemologists think, that 
everything I know is my evidence.26 Then, how probable is it that my judgment 
is true, given all of my available evidence? Probability 1. The fact that, 
conditional only on the genealogical evidence, my judgment is no more than 50% 
                                                     
26 For an argument for this identity, see Williamson 2000, sec. 9.7. 
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likely to be true is irrelevant. Compare the following situation. Suppose that I 
know that Mary tells the truth exactly half the time. She tells me that Liz is in 
Hawaii. Conditional only on the fact that Mary told me so, that Liz is in Hawaii 
is 50% likely to be true. But conditional on my total evidence – which includes 
the fact that I just saw Liz in Oxford – the probability of Liz’s being in Hawaii is 
rather lower. When genealogical evidence isn’t our only evidence, the 
conditional probability of a particular belief’s being true on the genealogical 
evidence does not itself settle whether I should continue to hold onto that belief.  
 
Of course, describing the evidential situation this way is to beg the question 
against the proponent of (APE). For the sceptic will naturally deny that it is part 
of my evidence that Jones doesn’t know. My only evidence, he will say, is that it 
seems to me that Jones doesn’t know, in conjunction with the genealogical fact 
that my judgment isn’t caused by its truth. There is a substantive 
epistemological question here about what constitutes evidence – one that I don’t 
intend to resolve. But let me briefly draw out two implications. The first is that 
the genealogical sceptic, insofar as his scepticism is based in his acceptance of 
(APE), seems to share something in common with the global sceptic. As 
Williamson (2004, 2000, 2007) points out, global sceptics typically operate by 
narrowing the range of dialectically permissible evidence. Normally I take my 
total evidence to include facts about the external world. For example, I see Liz in 
the library, and use that as evidence to infer that she’s not in Hawaii, that she’s 
working on her dissertation, that she might fancy a drink later, and so on. But 
the sceptic narrows my evidence, granting only that it seems to me that Liz is in 
the library: how do I know that I am not hallucinating, or a recently envatted 
brain? He then challenges me to reason outward from my inner mental state of 
seeming to see Liz, to the (putative) external fact that Liz is indeed in the library. 
 
We might say something similar about the dialectical situation involving the 
proponent of (APE). Normally, I include in my total evidence the fact that Jones 
doesn’t know, using this for example as evidence that justified-true-belief 
analysis of knowledge is false. But the proponent of (APE) insists that my only 
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evidence is that it seems to me that Jones doesn’t know. I am then challenged to 
reason outward from my mental state of judging that Jones doesn’t know to the 
(putative) fact that Jones doesn’t know. Once our philosophical evidence is 
psychologised – transformed from the propositional content of our judgments to 
the bare fact that we have these particular judgments – we are in a quandary, for 
there is no clear route from the psychological fact to the philosophical fact. 
 
Since genealogical sceptics are not global sceptics, we might think they carry the 
burden of explaining why their psychologisation of the evidence is different from 
the psychologisation of evidence employed by the traditional external world 
sceptic. For example, Joshua Alexander (2012, 104ff.) claims that for a 
philosopher to justifiably use her Gettier judgment as evidence, she must be able 
first to persuade an interlocutor who doesn’t share that judgment of its truth. 
But a similar demand could be made for any premise whatsoever; if everything 
has to be defended to the satisfaction of the sceptic, then it will turn out that 
nothing is defensible. Why should we not include the contents of our 
philosophical judgments as evidence, but are permitted to include the putative 
facts that our judgments are such-and-such and have such-and-such genealogies? 
In other words, why should we let the genealogical sceptic set the appropriate 
standard of evidence, but not the global sceptic?  
 
Anti-sceptical epistemologists like Williamson will not, consistently with their 
antecedent views, be sympathetic to (APE) due to its resemblance to the global 
sceptical argument. But to insist that (APE) is sound – and, in particular, that 
(14) is true – is to insist on a philosophical judgment that itself seems prima facie 
susceptible to (APE) . Conditional on the genealogical evidence, the probability 
that the sceptic’s judgment that (14) is true is itself true seems no better than 
50%. Thus (14) seems to imply that we would be unjustified in believing it. 
  
 3.5 Unreliability 
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I have saved what I take to be the most epistemologically promising argument 
for genealogical scepticism for last. The argument deploys the widely-accepted 
safety condition on knowledge, according to which S knows p only if S could not 
have easily falsely believed p using a sufficiently similar method to the one she 
actually uses to form her belief that p (Sosa 1999). More simply, one’s belief must 
be based on a reliable method, one that does not produce nearby false beliefs. 
Unlike the sensitivity condition, the safety condition does not swiftly generate 
the result that we know nothing at all. My belief that I’m not a brain-in-a-vat in 
insensitive: if I were a brain-in-a-vat, I would still believe that I wasn’t. But my 
belief that I’m not a brain-in-a-vat is – on the assumption that I’m in fact 
embodied, and that there’s no nearby threat of being envatted – safe. So safety 
has the benefit of capturing the intuitive importance of reliable truth-tracking for 
knowledge but, because that demand is confined to an agent’s modal 
neighbourhood, does not generate sceptical worries. 
 
Safety is generally considered an externalist condition on justification. According 
to epistemic internalism, justification supervenes entirely on states that are 
suitably ‘internal’ to agents. How this notion of ‘internal’ is unpacked generates 
two varieties of internalism. According to ‘access’ internalism, justification 
supervenes solely on states to which agents have privileged first-personal access, 
i.e. some subset of the conscious mental states (Chisholm 1977; BonJour 1985). 
According to ‘mental state’ internalism, justification supervenes solely on a 
certain cluster of non-factive mental states, whether or not agents enjoy 
privileged access to those states (Conee and Feldman 2001; cf. Wedgwood 2002). 
Externalism is the denial of the claim that justification supervenes entirely on 
non-factive mental states. Safety is an externalist condition on justification 
because the modal profile of one’s belief is not itself a mental state. 
 
But safety considerations can be deployed by internalists too. Most internalists 
will agree that strong evidence that one’s belief is unsafe defeats the justification 
of one’s belief. That is, even if one’s belief was previously (internalistically) 
justified, acquiring evidence that it is unsafe renders it (internalistically) 
  The Archimedean Urge 
 
 22 
unjustified. Suppose Charlotte sees a red book on the laboratory table and forms 
the true belief that there is a red book on the table. Then her chemistry teacher – 
whom Charlotte has every reason to believe is trustworthy and reliable – 
informs her that there is a red light shining on the table, a light that makes non-
red objects appear red. This constitutes evidence that Charlotte’s belief is unsafe; 
Charlotte now has reason to believe that her visual inspection of the book on the 
table could have easily led her to have a false belief. Internalists will want to say 
that, so long as Charlotte has no reason to mistrust her teacher, and has no 
reasons independent of her visual inspection for believing that there is a red 
book on the table, her belief is rendered unjustified by the new evidence she has 
acquired. So while internalists won’t endorse a safety condition on knowledge, 
they will most likely endorse what we might call an internalist safety condition, 
according to which strong evidence of unsafety defeats justification. 
 
What will an externalist want to say about this sort of case? Suppose the 
teacher’s testimony is truthful: there really is a red light shining on the table. 
Then it is the case that Charlotte’s belief is unsafe, and according to the 
externalist, unjustified. Importantly, this was true before Charlotte received the 
teacher’s testimony. The receipt of the testimony simply allows Charlotte to 
come to know that her belief is, and indeed has always been, unjustified. Now 
suppose that there is in fact no red light, and thus that the teacher’s testimony is 
misleading. What will the externalist say about this? Here things are trickier. 
First, we can distinguish between those externalists who do and do not 
countenance the possibility of defeat, the loss of justification through the mere 
acquisition of new evidence.27 Defeatist externalists will say that, although the 
teacher’s testimony is misleading, it nonetheless destroys Charlotte’s 
justification (Goldman 1986, 62-3, 111-2; Alston 1988b, 238-9; Nozick 1981, 
196). Thus the defeatist externalist gives the same verdict as our internalist. 
 
                                                     
27 I say ‘mere’ to distinguish genuine defeat cases from cases in which an agent loses justification 
because the acquisition of new evidence results in the agent’s ceasing to believe or changing the 
basis of her belief. 
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But what of those externalists who reject defeat? Here we can further distinguish 
between dogmatic anti-defeatists and akratic anti-defeatists. Dogmatic anti-
defeatists think that one can retain the epistemic status of one’s belief – as 
justified, rational or knowledge – so long as one dismisses the misleading 
evidence. Thus dogmatists will say that Charlotte can dismiss her teacher’s 
misleading testimony, thereby retaining her justified belief that there is a red 
book on the table.28 By contrast, akratic anti-defeatists think that in such cases 
one should not dismiss the misleading evidence; if one believes anything about 
one’s first-order belief, one should believe that it lacks the relevant epistemic 
status. But compatible with that, according to the akratic anti-defeatist, is 
maintaining a justified (or rational or knowledgable) first-order belief. Thus 
Charlotte can justifiably believe that there is a red book on the table, while also 
justifiably believing that that belief is unjustified. 
 
The safety-based argument I’m going to formulate on behalf of the genealogical 
sceptic will aim to be acceptable to both internalists and defeat-friendly 
externalists. I’ll return to the discussion of anti-defeatists – of both the dogmatic 
and akratic variety – later. But first, one more preliminary. The propositions 
under discussion in this paper – namely, philosophical propositions – are 
plausibly necessary; if Gettier’s Jones doesn’t know, it is necessarily the case that he 
doesn’t know. Beliefs about necessary propositions will trivially satisfy Sosa’s 
safety condition.29 But a related condition can be constructed for beliefs about 
necessary propositions: 
 
SAFETYn: S’s belief in the necessary proposition p is safen iff S could 
not have easily believed not-p using a sufficiently similar method she 
uses to believe p. 
 
                                                     
28 Some dogmatists, for example Plantinga and Thomas Nagel, think that only certain kinds of 
judgments are immune from defeat. I discuss this in more detail shortly. 
29 A similar problem arises for appeal to sensitivity conditions in sceptical arguments against 
philosophical judgment. See n. 13. 
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Suppose I am very poor at math. I want to know the sum of 236 and 582. After 
struggling to add the sums in my head, I take a guess and come to believe it’s 
818. I now believe a necessary truth. My belief is thus trivially safe, since there 
are no nearby (or indeed any) worlds in which 236 plus 582 doesn’t equal 818. 
But my belief is not safen. For the method I used to arrive at my true belief – 
wild guessing – easily leads me to believe that the sum of 236 and 582 is not 818. 
I’ll use this notion to construct a final argument for genealogical scepticism: 
 
Argument from Unreliability (AU) 
(16) The genealogy of our philosophical judgments constitutes 
strong, undefeated evidence that those judgments are unsafen 
(17) Whenever we have strong, undefeated evidence that one of our 
judgments is unsafen, we ought to abandon it 
(18) We ought to abandon our philosophical judgments 
 
Again, this argument can be unpacked depending on what sort of specific 
genealogical debunking claim is at issue. With experimental debunking, ‘our’ 
refers to the philosophical judgments shared by some group. So the experimental 
philosopher can argue that his data – that philosophical judgments 
systematically vary with culture, gender, socioeconomic status, philosophical 
training and so on – gives you (say, a rich white male professional philosopher) 
decisive reason to believe that your philosophical judgments are unsafen. This is 
because the experimental data suggest that, using the method you actually use to 
arrive at your philosophical judgments, you could have easily believed the 
opposite of those judgments – if you were poor, non-white, female or 
philosophically untrained. Since the experimental data give you decisive reason 
to believe that your philosophical judgments are unreliable, you ought to 
abandon those judgments. 
 
The evolutionary debunking version of (AU) will run similarly. The 
evolutionary data provides us with strong, undefeated evidence that our 
philosophical judgments are unsafen. Why? Because our evolutionary history 
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could have easily gone differently, and had it done so, our method of 
philosophical judgment would have given rise to contrary philosophical 
judgments. If it’s true that we could have easily had opposing moral or other 
philosophical judgments, then it seems that the method we use to arrive at our 
actual philosophical judgments – roughly, the method of believing in accordance 
with our evolutionarily-selected dispositions to judge – could easily lead us into 
falsity. Recognising this, the evolutionary debunker might argue, we should 
abandon our philosophical judgments.30 
 
A version of (AU) can also be deployed to support the conciliatory verdict on the 
question of peer disagreement – roughly, the verdict that disagreement with an 
epistemic peer defeats one’s justification (Feldman 2006; Elga 2007; Christensen 
2007a, 2010, 2011). Suppose you and your best friend Hussein always go to 
lunch and split the bill. You have equally reliable track records when it comes to 
doing the mental math required to figure out how much you each owe. On this 
occasion, you believe that you each owe x dollars and Hussein believes that you 
each owe x+1 dollars. Many think that, in such a case, you ought to abandon 
your belief that you each owe x dollars, and only re-instate it after you have 
double-checked or achieved some independent confirmation that you were 
right.31 (AU) gives us a promising way of vindicating this thought. For we might 
think that the fact that Hussein disagrees with you constitutes strong undefeated 
evidence that your judgment (that you each owe x dollars) is unreliable. For 
Hussein’s disagreement suggests that you could have easily, using the method of 
mental math, arrived at the belief that you each owe not-x. In the face of this 
decisive reason to believe your judgment is unsafen, you ought to (at least 
temporarily) abandon it. 
                                                     
30 It’s worth noting that there is nothing about (AU) that requires systematic variation in 
philosophical judgments. Suppose that there was simply random disagreement about 
philosophical questions that did not track any other (cultural, gender, training, and so on) 
vectors. This would plausibly still constitute prima facie evidence of the unreliability of these 
judgments. This is something of a puzzle. On one hand, the safety-theoretic version of the 
argument for genealogical scepticism is (I think) most epistemologically compelling. On the 
other, it does not essentially involve one of the intuitively most troubling features of genealogical 
contingency: namely, its systematicity. 
31 This case I borrow from Christensen 2011. 
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Before discussing how the defender of philosophical judgment might respond to 
(AU), I want to point out that the present argument signals a shift in the flow of 
discussion. My suspicion is that what people find intuitively compelling about 
genealogical scepticism doesn’t have much to do with considerations of safety. 
Instead I suspect that when considering evolutionary or experimental debunking 
arguments, people are struck by the (putative) revelation that what is ‘really 
doing the work’ behind our beliefs are forces orthogonal to the truth of those 
beliefs – forces of evolution, culture and so on. This then sends one into sceptical 
free-fall: If our beliefs have nothing to do with the truth, how can we trust them? This 
thought can be cashed out in various ways: in terms of explanatory inertness, or 
coincidence, or probabilities. But one dialectical weakness these arguments share, 
as I have tried to bring out, is the presupposition that there is no causal 
connection between our philosophical judgments and the philosophical truths – 
an assumption denied by some philosophers for many domains of philosophical 
judgment. By contrast, (AU) doesn’t suppose that no causal connection exists 
between our philosophical judgments and the philosophical truths. Rather, it 
suggests, more weakly, that even if there is some sort of causal connection 
between the philosophical truths and our philosophical judgments, that 
connection is insufficiently reliable to produce knowledge. In a sense it’s a less 
thrilling point to make; it doesn’t inspire the same sort of sceptical vertigo as the 
earlier arguments. But this, I submit, is a feature rather than a bug. Defending 
our philosophical judgments against (AU) is a subtler and more interesting 
business. I’ll now turn to how that might be done. 
 
Recall our branching taxonomy of epistemologists. First we have the distinction 
between internalists and externalists. Within externalists we have defeatists and 
anti-defeatists. And finally we have both dogmatic and akratic anti-defeatists. So 
we have four kinds of epistemologists to consider: internalists, defeatist 
externalists, dogmatic anti-defeatist externalists and akratic anti-defeatist 
externalists. I’m going to discuss how each kind of epistemologist might respond 
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to (AU) in turn. Because they handle misleading higher-order evidence in the 
same way, I’ll group together internalists and defeatist externalists. 
 
 2.5.1. Internalists and defeatist externalists 
 
Premise (16) of (AU) says that the genealogy of our philosophical judgments 
constitutes strong undefeated evidence that those judgments are unsafen. If that’s 
true, then internalists and defeatist externalists alike will conclude that we ought 
to abandon those judgments.32 But why think (16) true? Why think that the 
relevant genealogical evidence is evidence that our philosophical judgments are 
unsafen? 
 
Take the putative variation in Gettier judgments with extent of philosophical 
training. To simplify matters, suppose that those with philosophical training 
share the judgment that Jones doesn’t know, and that those without 
philosophical training judge that Jones does know. The proponent of (AU) 
thinks that this constitutes evidence that our (that is, we philosophers’) Gettier 
judgments are unsafen. But this is only true if the methods used by philosophers 
and non-philosophers to arrive at their respective Gettier judgments are indeed 
‘sufficiently similar’. One might think instead that two quite dissimilar methods 
are in play here – the expert method employed by philosophers, say, and the lay 
method used by the philosophically untrained (Bealer 1998; Devitt 2006, 2011; 
Kauppinen 2007; Sosa 2007; Williamson 2007, 191-2; Liao 2008; Pinillos et al. 
2011).33 Similar things could be said in response to other instances of (AU). For 
example, one might think that the method we humans use to arrive at our moral 
                                                     
32 This is an oversimplification. Wedgwood for example is an internalist who endorses akrasia 
about (both deductive and non-deductive) inference (2011). That is, he thinks that certain beliefs 
formed on the basis of competent inference, unlike perceptual beliefs, are not susceptible to 
defeat. Thus Wedgwood will think that at least some of our ‘philosophical judgments’, if the 
result of competent inference, will be immune from defeat. For the sake of simplicity I am going 
to bracket this sort of internalist view. 
33 Alvin Plantinga (1995) gives a similar response to genealogical attacks on the rationality of 
religious exclusivism. He argues that it might be the case that the Christian is using a superior 
method in arriving at her Christian belief, and that the non-Christian “has made a mistake, or has a 
blind spot, or hasn’t been wholly attentive, or hasn’t received some grace she has, or is in some 
way epistemically less fortunate” (205). 
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judgments is rather dissimilar from the method that would be used by creatures 
who developed a radically different morality thanks to a different evolutionary 
history. Our method, we might say, is one that is sensitive to genuine moral 
reasons, while the method used by these other creates lacks such sensitivity. And 
so on. If so, then (16) is false: the genealogical evidence is not evidence that our 
philosophical judgments are unreliable. 
 
Whenever we speak of methods of belief-formation in accounts of epistemic 
reliability we come up against what is known as the generality problem for 
reliabilism (Goldman 1979; Conee and Feldman 1998). How are we to type the 
relevant methods when evaluating the safety of a given belief? In general, a very 
coarse-grained typing of ‘sufficiently similar method’ will give us the absurd 
conclusion that practically no belief is reliable, while a maximally fine-grained 
typing will give us the equally absurd conclusion that every belief is reliable.34 
Whether or not the generality problem is a fundamental problem for safety (and 
other reliabilist) accounts of knowledge, it does pose a dialectical challenge here. 
For the steadfast philosopher will take her philosophical judgments to constitute 
knowledge, and will on that basis judge that the methods in question are 
sufficiently dissimilar not to undermine that knowledge. Meanwhile the sceptic 
will deny that these philosophical judgments do constitute knowledge, and so 
will insist that the relevant methods are to be typed more coarsely. The 
generality problem means that there is no dialectically neutral way of settling 
this question. So again, the sceptic and defender of philosophical judgment will 
find themselves begging the question against each other. 
 
 2.5.2. Dogmatic anti-defeatism 
 
                                                     
34 A similar problem arises for the question of which worlds count as ‘nearby’ in modal conditions 
such as safety and safetyn. This would be an alternative way for defenders of philosophical 
judgment to go, i.e. arguing that the worlds in which they would have mistaken philosophical 
judgments are too far away to undermine the reliability of their actual judgments. I myself find 
this kind of defence more plausible against evolutionary debunking arguments than experimental 
debunking arguments, though see White (2010) for a defence of the latter. 
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According to Thomas Nagel, certain beliefs – well-formed beliefs about moral, 
logical and mathematical truths – are simply immune from defeat (1996). He 
thus rejects (17): at least some of our genealogically contingent philosophical 
judgments are thus unscathed by (AU). Plantinga meanwhile argues that certain 
judgments – ones that are ‘properly basic’ – are what he calls “intrinsic defeaters” 
(1986, 311), meaning that their contents defeat any potential defeaters. Thus, 
assuming that our philosophical judgments are properly basic,35 Plantinga will 
reject (16): the genealogical evidence does not constitute undefeated evidence that 
our philosophical judgments are unreliable. Maria Aarnio-Lasonen (2010) puts 
forward a more general anti-defeat case, arguing that we can always retain 
knowledgable belief by acting dogmatically in the face of misleading 
evidence.36,37 
 
For the sake of simplicity I’m going to focus on Plantinga’s form of dogmatic 
anti-defeatism. Suppose that I’m confronted with evidence that my judgments 
about Gettier cases are unreliable, for it turns out that those judgments are 
culturally contingent. According to Plantinga, if my Gettier judgments are in 
fact properly formed – and thus the genealogical evidence misleading – then I 
can use the contents of those very judgments to dismiss the misleading evidence. 
Thus I can reason as follows: The genealogical evidence suggests that my Gettier 
judgments are unreliable. But in Gettier cases the subjects don’t know. So my Gettier 
judgments are reliable, and the genealogical evidence is misleading. 
 
The sceptic will protest that this is a form of bootstrapping, using a method to 
confirm its own reliability without any independent confirmation. Thus Robert 
Cummins complains that  
                                                     
35 Plantinga believes that many of our philosophical judgments are properly basic – for example, 
our moral judgments. 
36 Though in her (2014), Aarnio-Lasonen seems more sympathetic to an akratic form of anti-
defeatism. 
37 It’s important to note that while Aarnio-Lasonen thinks it is possible to retain knowledge in 
the face of misleading evidence, she thinks that doing so is often unreasonable and thus 
epistemically criticisable. So it’s not clear how much comfort her view offers to the philosopher 
who wishes to hold onto her philosophical judgments in the face of (possibly misleading) 
genealogical evidence. 
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we have no access to the workings of intuition that is independent of 
intuition itself; thus, intuition cannot be calibrated against errors in 
the way that a scientific device can (1998, 116-7, italics added). 
 
Jonathan Weinberg makes a similar point in his discussion of philosophical 
expertise: 
 
Trained expert judgments, for example, like those of chess grand 
masters or medical diagnosticians, lie outside the range of my 
critique; so too do our judgments in most ordinary cases that some 
particular object or event falls under a particular concept. I am not 
attacking such intuitions as those not because they are immune to 
worries about hopefulness, but because by and large they are in fact 
hopeful. Both expert judgments and ordinary categorizations usually 
possess a great deal of external corroboration and internal coherence 
(2007, 334-5, italics added). 
 
Weinberg’s implication is that, unlike the doctor or chess master, the 
philosopher lacks recourse to suitably independent corroboration of the reliability 
of her judgments. Of course much hangs on what we consider an ‘independent’ 
means of corroboration. When I use my sensory apparatus – say, in scientific 
experimentation – to confirm the reliability of the human sensory apparatus, am 
I thereby illicitly bootstrapping my way into ‘easy knowledge’? Presumably not. 
Compare the case of my Gettier judgment. When I consider the Gettier case, I 
find myself strongly disposed to judge that Jones doesn’t know. Suppose, after 
forming my Gettier judgment, I then think abstractly about the nature of 
knowledge, and conclude that it is incompatible with certain forms of luck. Then 
I return to the Gettier case and realise that it involves a certain form of luck. 
Might this serve as independent corroboration of my initial judgment? 
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For the sake of argument let’s grant the sceptic that there is no suitably 
‘independent’ means of corroborating the reliability of our philosophical 
judgments. If they are to be corroborated at all, it will be through a form of 
bootstrapping. Is this worrying? Whether bootstrapping is illicit or not is yet 
another matter of epistemological controversy. Jonathan Vogel (2000), Stewart 
Cohen (2002) and Roger White (2006) agree that bootstrapping – and the ‘easy 
knowledge’ it produces – are epistemically unkosher. Meanwhile Plantinga 
(1995) defends the use of bootstrapping in cases of religious and moral 
disagreement, and James van Cleve (2003) argues that if bootstrapping is illicit, 
the only alternative is scepticism. Without getting into the details of the relevant 
arguments, I’ll just offer one sort of case that puts pressure on the view that 
bootstrapping is always epistemically illicit: 
 
SURPRISE HOMOPHOBE: You have known your friend Robert for 
a few years now, and you believe his judgment to be as good as 
yours. For you agree on most things, and when you occasionally 
don’t, one is always able to change the mind of the other through 
reasoned conversation. One day you’re shocked to discover that 
Robert thinks that homosexuality is immoral. You discuss this for 
some time and realise your disagreement is bedrock. Robert simply 
has the strong, intuitive judgment that homosexuality is immoral. 
But on all other issues you continue to agree. 
 
What should your response be? Should you conclude that your judgment about 
homosexuality is unreliable, and therefore that you should abandon it? Plausibly 
not. Plausibly, you should conclude that Robert’s judgment on this question is 
impaired, perhaps because he has grown up in a bigoted home or is suffering 
from repression and self-hatred. Crucially, the only reason you have for 
concluding that Robert’s judgment is impaired – and thus that the disagreement 
is misleading evidence of your own unreliability – is the fact that homosexuality 
is not immoral. If bootstrapping is acceptable in some cases, we should ask to 
know why it is not acceptable in others. The (AU)-sceptic cannot simply assume 
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the illegitimacy of bootstrapping, or the falsity of dogmatic anti-defeatism – or at 
least, as I will argue shortly, not without risking self-defeat. 
  
 2.5.3 Akratic anti-defeatism 
 
A final response to (AU) comes from the akratic anti-defeatist. Unlike the 
internalist, defeatist externalist or dogmatic anti-defeatist, the akratic anti-
defeatist denies (17). That is, she thinks that it can be rationally permissible at 
the same time to (a) believe p, and (b) believe that one’s belief that p is 
unjustified.38 While many epistemologists assume or argue for the falsity of the 
akratic position (Feldman 2005; Kolodny 2005; Christensen 2007a, 2007b, 2010, 
2011; Elga 2007; Smithies 2012; Greco (2014); Horowitz (2014); Titelbaum 
2015), there is a growing pro-akrasia contingent. For example, Allen Coates 
(2012) and Brian Weatherson (m.s.) offer general arguments for the akratic 
conclusion that, in cases of misleading higher-order evidence, one can justifiably 
believe p and justifiably believe that one’s belief that p is unjustified. In such 
cases, Weatherson claims, “each conjunct is well-supported by the evidence” 
(ibid., 15) and thus rationally permissible to believe. And Coates claims that 
when higher-order evidence is misleading “we can rationally judge that our 
belief is irrational even though it is in fact rational, and so we can rationally be 
akratic”  (2012, 122). Williamson (2011) argues that a long competent deduction 
is a case in which epistemic akrasia is rational, since even if one has achieved 
knowledge through the deduction, one is still in a position to justifiably believe 
that one has made a mistake in one’s reasoning somewhere. Similarly, 
Wedgwood argues that a competent inference produces knowledge even when 
an agent rationally believes that it hasn’t, or rationally doubts that it has.39 
Williamson (2011) further argues that even when our perceptual evidence is 
strong enough to allow us to know, that evidence often makes it improbable that 
                                                     
38 Or if we’re speaking in terms of credences rather than outright belief, to maintain the same 
high credence in p whilst having also having a high credence in the proposition that one’s high 
credence in p is rationally impermissible. 
39 Wedgwood is an internalist who accepts the possibility of defeat for perceptual knowledge; he 
thinks that certain cases of competent inferences are special and thus license akratic treatment 
(see n. 32). 
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we do know. This is because we are not always, according to Williamson, in a 
position to know what our evidence is; thus our evidence can be massively 
misleading about the quality of our epistemic situation. To deny the rational 
permissibility of epistemic akrasia is, he argues, tantamount to scepticism about 
perceptual knowledge. 
 
One might hope to extend a broadly pro-akrasia view to genealogical evidence 
about philosophical judgment.40 Thus one might think that we are justified in 
believing, in light of the genealogical evidence, that our philosophical judgments 
are unjustified – but nonetheless think that, so long as those judgments are 
justified, we are permitted to maintain them. No doubt there is something 
uncomfortable about asserting and theorising on the basis of judgments one 
takes oneself probably not to know. (Though Richard Rorty’s figure of the 
liberal ironist (1989) might be thought of as the sort of person who is 
constitutively capable of embracing just this sort of discomfort.)41 And it’s an 
interesting question whether, as a psychological matter, one could really go on 
philosophising in this way. But for those who think that epistemic akrasia is 
sometimes rational, this might be a final way of resisting the pull of (AU)-
scepticism. 
 
Let me leave aside these thorny epistemological questions. My basic point, by 
now surely annoyingly familiar, is this. Whether (AU) is sound turns on various 
complex issues in epistemology: about method individuation, dogmatism, 
bootstrapping, akrasia and defeat. People’s judgments about (16) and (17) 
                                                     
40 Whether one can extend the particular arguments marshalled in favour of epistemic akrasia by 
Coates, Weatherson, Wedgwood and Williamson will turn on various questions about how we 
should think of what is going on in the formation of philosophical judgment – whether, for 
example, all philosophical judgments should be classified under Wedgwood’s heading of 
indefeasible inference, or whether philosophical judgments should be thought of as evidentially-
based (Coates and Weatherson). Note that Williamson’s ‘improbable knowing’ argument doesn’t 
easily extend to philosophical judgments since it crucially involves contingent truths and the 
notion of a margin-for-error. 
41 Another option in a similar spirit is to adopt some sort of contextualism about philosophical 
knowledge or knowledge-claims, where the ‘low standards’ context is the ordinary philosophical 
classroom, with a shift to a ‘high standards’ context happening whenever a naturalistic, 
genealogical account of philosophical judgments become salient (e.g. when the sociologist or 
evolutionary debunker walks into the room). 
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systematically vary; for example, willingness to accept or deny (17) is likely 
strongly correlated with whether one has studied philosophy at Oxford in the 
early 21st century. Does this not constitute strong, undefeated evidence that the 
sceptic’s judgment that (16) and (17) are true is itself unsafen? 
 
The sceptic will perhaps protest that his judgments that (16) and (17) are true 
are not susceptible to (AU). For he might claim that these judgments are the 
result of an expert method. Or the sceptic might argue that while the variation in 
judgments about (16) and (17) provides prima facie evidence that his judgments 
are unsafen, that evidence is defeated by the truth of (16) and (17). Or finally the 
sceptic might concede that his judgments are likely unsafen, but continue 
theorising on the basis of those judgments in the hope that they are – pace the 
genealogical evidence – safen. 
 
The first of these defences is the one most frequently invoked by genealogical 
sceptics, especially experimental philosophers: 
 
Our claim is neither epistemological nor metaphysical, but 
methodological (Swain, Alexander and Weinberg 2006, 151). 
 
I have heard the following tu quoque: ‘Your arguments against appeal 
to intuition in philosophy are themselves grounded in intuition.’ I do 
not think so; I think they are grounded in psychology and successful 
scientific practice (Cummins 1998, n. 8, 127). 
 
[S]ome uses of intuition, including those about logic and math, and 
about epistemic principles whose merits can be partially tested in the 
laboratory of the history of science, can reasonably be [considered 
reliable], and we can trust them for establishing premises to use in 
our arguments—including…my arguments here (Weinberg 2007, 
340). 
 
  The Archimedean Urge 
 
 35 
Here the sceptic’s thought seems to be: I am justified in believing and asserting 
the premises of my sceptical argument because they are the result of a special 
method – namely the method of good scientific practice.42 
 
The idea that something as various as scientific (or ‘ordinary’) practice could 
settle the question of whether (16) and (17) are true strikes me as a bit 
optimistic. Both (16) and (17) are fine-grained epistemological claims. Both fall 
out of a picture on which reliability is epistemically important -- a rough picture 
no doubt vindicated by good scientific practice. But it is a bit much to think that 
a general commitment to the epistemic importance of reliability contains the fine 
detail that these genealogical sceptics claim it does. Nowhere in the history of 
science have claims as specific as (16) or (17) been tested. A broad commitment 
to the epistemic importance of reliability is entirely compatible with the denial of 
(16), (17) or both. To move from the generalities of ‘good scientific practice’ to 
the specifics of (16) and (17) requires epistemological judgment: just the kind of 
judgment the genealogical sceptic wishes to undermine. 
 
So even with what I take to be the most epistemologically plausible argument for 
genealogical scepticism – one that sees genealogical revelations as higher-order 
evidence of unreliability that defeats first-order justification – there is still the 
                                                     
42 There is a striking parallel between the current debate and the aforementioned debate about 
the rationality of religious exclusivism. Plantinga makes a tu quoque charge against pluralist 
sceptics of religious exclusivism: 
But, of course, the same goes for the pluralist. Pluralism isn’t and hasn’t been 
widely popular in the world at large; if the pluralist had been born in Madagascar, 
or medieval France, he probably wouldn’t have been a pluralist. Does it follow that 
he shouldn’t be a pluralist or that his pluralist beliefs are produced in him by an 
unreliable belief-producing process? (1995, 212). 
The pluralist John Hick’s response to is to draw a distinction between religious and philosophical 
claims, in much the same way that the experimentalist draws a distinction between 
epistemological and methodological claims: 
[Plantinga’s] tu quoque, that I might well not have advocated religious pluralism if I 
had been born in many other times or places, and that I affirm it in much the same 
way that others affirm traditional Christianity, misses the all-important difference 
that religious pluralism…is not another religious faith or dogma alongside others, 
but a second-order philosophical theory, or hypothesis, about the relationship 
between the world religions when these are understood religiously as distinguished 
from naturalistically (Hick 2001, 57). 
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threat that the argument will turn out to be self-defeating, impugning our 
commitment to its own premises. 
 
3. In search of stable ground 
 
According to Sextus Empiricus, the sceptic does not put forward an argument in 
order to convince his interlocutor of its conclusion. Rather his argument is 
intended to reveal an instability in the interlocutor’s own accepted premises; it is 
the sceptic’s interlocutor who, by his own lights, knows nothing, including the 
premises that might support that very conclusion. The sceptic meanwhile simply 
suspends judgments on all matters, including his argument’s premises and 
conclusion – and recommends, for the sake of your psychic wellbeing, that you 
do the same. 
 
Genealogical scepticism should be taken seriously as such an ad hominem threat. 
In other words, it is not enough simply to note that the epistemological 
principles on which genealogical scepticism must rest plausibly undermine 
themselves. For we might find ourselves in the unfortunate position of being 
wedded to the premises of the genealogical sceptic’s argument. If so, then it is 
not the sceptic’s argument that is self-defeating, but our own epistemological 
framework. What we need is stable ground: a positive conception of what 
knowledge demands, and what we’re doing when we do philosophy, such that it 
does not turn out that, by our own lights, we cannot have philosophical 
knowledge. 
 
Three options for securing such stable ground present themselves. First, we 
might adopt an epistemological framework that is resistant to genealogical 
scepticism – an epistemological framework, as I have already suggested, that is 
tolerant of the role that luck (specifically, genealogical luck) plays in the 
acquisition of knowledge. I say a bit more about this suggestion in 3.1. In section 
3.2 I turn to a second alternative: embracing an anti-realism about the contents 
of philosophical judgments such that these judgments are resistant to 
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genealogical defeat. In 3.3 I discuss a third, more radical option: abandoning the 
idea that our philosophical commitments amount to beliefs at all. What I say 
below is both brief and exploratory; I don’t take myself to be endorsing any of 
these metaphilosophical views, though I confess some sympathy for all, and 
apprehension about each. 
 
3.1 Luck-friendly epistemology  
 
Epistemologists differ over the extent to which luck plays a role in the 
acquisition of knowledge. All epistemologists will agree that luck has some role 
to play. Bad luck can preclude knowledge; the brain-in-a-vat gets to know very 
little at all – perhaps only how things appear to him – because he has the bad 
luck of being envatted. And good luck can produce knowledge; if I by chance 
turn my head at just the right moment, I’ll come to know that a sparrow has just 
landed on the fence. Where epistemologists disagree is on just how much 
knowledge we can acquire through good luck. Indeed this has been a theme 
running through this paper. Recall the Argument from Coincidence (§2.2). One 
response I said the anti-sceptic might give is simply to accept that it is 
coincidental that our philosophical judgments track the philosophical truths. The 
sceptic will think this is an insufficient response, demanding some independent 
confirmation of the putative coincidence. The anti-sceptic will concede that no 
such independent confirmation is available, but maintain that this doesn’t 
undermine the claim to philosophical knowledge. At issue here is whether the 
philosopher can know her philosophy judgments simply by being a beneficiary of 
good genealogical luck – the luck of having judgments that do, as a contingent 
matter, track the philosophical truths – without having any independent grounds 
for thinking herself so lucky.  
 
Similarly, consider the Argument from Unsafety (§2.5). One way of responding 
to that argument, I said, is to insist that the beliefs in question are not the 
product of sufficiently similar methods. For example one might insist (to take up 
our contrived case again) that the belief-forming methods of Westerners are not 
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sufficiently similar to the belief-forming methods of Easterners to undermine the 
reliability of Western beliefs. To insist on this would be to deny that the internal 
symmetry of Western and Eastern beliefs undermines Western claims to 
knowledge. As (let us suppose) a steadfast Westerner I am confident not only of 
my beliefs but also that my belief-forming method is the superior one, even while 
knowing that I would feel the same, mutatis mutandis, if I were an Easterner. In 
other words, I am treating the Easterner as my brain-in-a-vat counterpart: 
unluckily ‘envatted’, as it were, in an Eastern genealogy. Meanwhile, I take 
myself to be luckily ‘embodied’ in a Western genealogy – and this to be sufficient 
for knowledge. 
 
Another way of responding to the Argument from Unsafety, I said, is to adopt 
the akratic strategy of accepting that the relevant genealogical evidence 
constitutes decisive reason to think that one’s philosophical judgments are 
probably non-knowledgeable, but to insist nonetheless that they might be 
knowledgeable, so long as they meet the externalist conditions for knowledge. 
On such a view, even if one is doing what looks to oneself as rationally 
impermissible, one might still be doing what is rationally permissible. This 
means that one can, as it were, stumble into rationality or knowledge, even if by 
one’s own lights one is acting improperly.  
 
In general, a luck-tolerant epistemology – specifically an epistemology that is 
tolerant of genealogical luck – will be robust against genealogical scepticism. 
The more one is willing to draw an epistemological asymmetry between people 
with different genealogies, the more one will be able to protect the knowledge of 
those with the ‘right’ genealogies. Of course this strategy can lead one to say 
some ethically unsavoury things, for example that Westerners or trained 
philosophers have an epistemically superior method of belief-formation than 
Easterners or lay people. Indeed I think our judgments about the role that luck 
plays in the acquisition of knowledge are intimately bound up with our moral 
worldview. In particular they appear to be bound up with the conviction, 
widespread in modernity, that people are only appropriately judged for those 
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things that lie within their sphere of control. It seems to us deeply unfair to 
judge someone negatively for something that befell her as a matter of bad luck, 
and similarly unfair to judge someone positively for something that happened to 
her merely as a matter of good luck. A similar instinct can drive a certain 
sceptical attitude toward knowledge: it would be unfair if some were blocked 
from acquiring knowledge because of an unfavourable genealogy, and similarly 
unfair if others were privy to knowledge because of some genealogical fluke. 
This instinct will be checked by the commonsense recognition that certain 
contingent things must be in place to allow for knowledge; had I never been 
taught math, I wouldn’t know anything about calculus. But here we perhaps 
console ourselves with the thought that any intelligent agent, whatever her 
current beliefs, could be brought around to seeing how the calculus operates. We 
fear that the same thing cannot be said of morality, religion or philosophy. In 
these cases, different genealogies produce deep, embedded and structural 
disagreements. If everyone is going to be equally in a position to acquire 
knowledge in these domains, then genealogy cannot matter so decisively. Thus 
the natural push to nihilism, according to which everyone is equally ignorant – 
or some sort of relativism, according to which everyone equally knows. 
 
On the alternative view I’ve been laying out (not one I endorse), we must accept 
that to get it right in philosophy (as elsewhere) requires having the right 
genealogy, and this is never entirely within agential control. As I’ve said, such a 
metaphilosophical view can doubtless sound morally unsavoury. Such moral 
qualms play a large role in the debate about the rationality of religious 
exclusivism in the face of religious diversity:43  
 
Ethically, Religious Exclusivism has the morally repugnant result of 
making those who have privileged knowledge, or who are 
intellectually astute, a religious elite, while penalizing those who 
happen to have no access to the putatively correct religious view, or 
                                                     
43 See fns. 7 and 33. 
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who are incapable of advanced understanding…(Runzo 1988, 197-
343). 
 
…except at the cost of insensitivity or delinquency, it is morally not 
possible actually to go out into the world and say to devout, 
intelligent fellow human beings we believe that we know God and we 
are right; you believe that you know God, and you are totally wrong 
(Smith 1976, 14). 
 
There is a striking resemblance here to many of the things said by experimental 
philosophers. For example, Machery et al. claim that “[i]n the absence of a 
principled argument about why philosophers’ intuitions are superior, [analytic 
philosophy of language] smacks of narcissism in the extreme” (2004, 9, emphasis 
added).  
 
In my view, the moralising language apparent in much genealogical scepticism is 
more than just rhetorical bluster. It signals a genuine discomfort with the idea 
that getting philosophy right could be a matter of radical genealogical luck – and 
a genuine discomfort with anyone proclaiming themselves in this way lucky. 
That a certain moral conviction is in play here is brought out by cases in which 
this conviction comes into conflict with other deeply held moral beliefs. Recall 
my case in which you discover your friend Robert to be an entrenched 
homophobe. My contention was that this case constitutes a plausible 
counterexample to the claim that one cannot bootstrap oneself into knowing that 
one’s judgment is the result of a distinct and (superior) method. Inasmuch as this 
case works, I think it does so because it combats one moral conviction – that 
access to moral knowledge isn’t a matter of genealogical luck – with another, 
stronger moral conviction: that homosexuality is ethically unobjectionable. 
 
That in some cases it seems plausible to say that getting it right is a matter of 
genealogical luck – the luck of growing up in an unbigoted household, or not 
being a brain-in-a-vat, or having had math lessons – is some reason to think that 
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we should abandon the moral conviction that drives us to say that some kinds of 
knowledge are immune from genealogical luck. Another reason, is that we can 
draw a distinction between doing well (or poorly) on one hand, and being 
praiseworthy (or blameworthy) on the other. That some group has the good 
fortune of possessing a knowledge-conducive genealogy – and another the bad 
fortune of not – hardly makes the former praiseworthy or the latter 
blameworthy, anymore than I am praiseworthy for being in a position to know I 
have hands, and my brain-in-a-vat counterpart blameworthy for not being in 
such a position. Drawing this distinction goes some small way, perhaps, toward 
alleviating concerns about the moral repugnance of a view that embraces the 
importance of genealogical luck for philosophical knowledge. But it certainly, I 
admit, does not go all the way. 
 
3.2 Anti-realism about philosophical truths 
 
I’ve said that we are in search of stable ground – an epistemological framework 
and a conception of what we’re doing when we do philosophy that, taken 
together, does not imply that we lack philosophical knowledge. In the last 
section I suggested that an epistemological framework that embraces 
genealogical luck is one way of finding such stable ground, albeit with some 
uneasy consequences. An alternative is to change our conception of what we’re 
doing when we do philosophy. Throughout this paper I’ve assumed a realism 
about philosophy’s subject matter – that what we’re after are the mind-
independent philosophical truths. Some genealogical debunking arguments 
precisely target such realism; for example, Street’s evolutionary debunking 
argument against metanormative realism intends to show that if one accepts 
metanormative realism then one must accept that we lack moral knowledge. Her 
solution is not to accept moral ignorance, but rather to embrace some sort of 
metanormative anti-realism – one that is not susceptible to the debunking 
argument. If the evaluative truths are constitutively connected to an agent’s 
beliefs about the evaluative truths such that, by necessity, they cannot come 
wildly apart, then the debunker’s argument is blocked. Another way of putting 
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the thought is this: if the evaluative truths are relative to agents’ evaluative 
beliefs, then no one will be able to suffer from bad genealogical luck when it 
comes to evaluative knowledge; evaluative knowledge will be open to all, 
regardless of where they come from. By adopting a suitable anti-realism about a 
domain of philosophical judgment, one can retain one’s (relatively luck-
intolerant) epistemology while holding onto knowledge in that domain. 
 
A related alternative is to think of the subject matter of philosophy not as the 
mind-independent truths about, e.g. knowledge or free will or the good, but 
rather our concepts of knowledge, free will or the good. This is the sort of 
metaphilosophical view that Bernard Williams held, at least as it applied to our 
moral and political commitments and concepts. (Williams famously thought that 
in the case of scientific knowledge, a genealogically-transcendent ‘absolute 
perspective’ was possible.) Commenting on Rorty’s proposal that liberals adopt 
an ironic attitude towards their own political commitments (see §2.5.3), Williams 
wrote: 
 
[O]nce one goes far enough in recognizing contingency, the problem 
to which irony is supposed to provide the answer does not arise at 
all…[B]ecause we are not unencumbered intelligences selecting in 
principle among all possible outlooks, we can accept that this outlook 
is ours just because of the history that has made it ours; or, more 
precisely, has made both us, and made the outlook as something that 
is ours…We and our outlook are not simply in the same place at the 
same time. If we really understand this, deeply understand it, we can 
be free of what is indeed another scientistic illusion, that it is our job 
as rational agents to search for, or at least move as best we can 
towards, a system of political and ethical ideas which would be the 
best from an absolute point of view, a point of view that was free of 
contingent historical perspective (2000, 193-4). 
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For Williams, elucidating our contingent concepts and systematising our 
contingent judgments was no arbitrary project, for it was the project of making 
sense, he thought, of ourselves. One might hope to take a similar attitude about 
philosophy in general: its job, we might think, is not to get the world right, but 
rather to get ourselves right. 
 
3.3 Rethinking philosophical ‘belief’ 
 
Sextus famously advised that we suspend judgment about all things, including 
the sceptic’s argument. Might the philosopher do the same in response to the 
genealogical sceptic – that is, simply suspend judgment on whether any of her 
philosophical judgments constitute knowledge, given their genealogies? But 
how, we might wonder, could such a philosopher possibly continue to 
philosophise? This worry is a version of what is known as the Apraxia Charge 
against Pyrrhonian scepticism. According to that charge, the sceptic who 
suspends judgment about everything is incapable of action, for action 
presupposes belief. Is it really possible for the philosopher to continue to perform 
philosophical actions – to entertain thought experiments, make arguments, 
deliberate and debate – all the while suspending judgment about all 
philosophical questions? 
 
It depends of course what ‘suspending judgment’ really amounts to. According 
to Michael Frede (1979, 1984), the sceptics’ answer to the Apraxia Charge lies in 
§1.13 of Outlines of Pyrrhonism, in which Sextus seems to distinguish between 
two kinds of assent, only one of which he takes to be problematic in its 
dogmatism.44 Dogmatic assent, Frede claims, involves an outright belief and 
assertion of how things really are, while non-dogmatic assent does not. This is 
how we are to understand the sceptic’s claim, in acting, to being merely guided 
by appearances (§1.21-24) and, in speaking, to be merely reporting how things 
                                                     
44 For a critical response, see Burnyeat 1980 and Burnyeat and Frede 1997. 
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seem to him (§1.21-24).45 Thus Frede writes that “having a view involves one 
kind of assent, whereas taking a position, or making a claim, involves another 
kind of assent, namely the kind of assent the sceptic will withhold” (1984, 128), 
and “[t]o be left with the impression or thought that p…does not involve the 
further thought that it is true that p” (ibid., §133). If Frede’s reading is correct, 
then perhaps the philosopher might be able to act on – indeed philosophise on – 
her genealogically contingent judgments, without thereby being dogmatically 
committed to premises that undermine that very commitment. Indeed, in his 
discussion of how thought is possible for the sceptic, Sextus explains that we 
acquire our conceptual structure not through dogmatically assenting to various 
propositions, but rather through cultural transmission and education; acting in 
accordance with this conceptual structure then does not constitute dogmatism 
(§1.23 – 4).  
 
I’m not in a position to comment on whether Frede’s interpretation of Sextus is 
correct. But I do think its application to the question of what stance one might 
take on one’s own philosophical judgments is interesting. It is true that cannot 
treat oneself as a purely psychological phenomenon; one must take up at least 
some of one’s views from the internal perspective to be able to think and act at 
all. This is what is certainly right in the Apraxia Charge. But according to 
Frede’s Sextus, there is a belief-like attitude that is somewhere in between 
outright belief and total psychologisation, between a wholehearted assent to p 
and the detached observation that one is inclined to judge that p. If there is 
indeed such a space, it might provide a home for the philosopher who finds her 
own epistemological commitments undermining themselves.46 
 
There are other similar ways of rethinking what sort of attitudes we do or could 
take towards our philosophical commitments, such that those commitments are 
or would be robust against genealogical debunking. One might for example 
                                                     
45 That is (according to Frede), the key distinction is not between beliefs with different contents 
(how things are versus how things appear) but rather different kinds of doxastic attitude (one of 
full-on dogmatic belief, and another somehow short of that). 
46 Marcus Giaquinto suggested to me that this is roughly how we should understand Hume’s 
metaphilosophical outlook. 
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think that philosophers don’t (or shouldn’t) believe their views outright, but 
merely ‘accept’ them – where acceptance either amounts to some practical 
commitment to act as if they we believed them,47 or some other belief, for 
example the belief that the philosophical view in question has various theoretical 
virtues48, or even practical ones.49 To take refuge from genealogical scepticism 
by adopting such a metaphilosophical view would involve not merely 
reconceptualising what it is we are doing when we do philosophy, but perhaps 
changing our philosophical practice. For those (like me) who already take their 
relationship to many of their philosophical commitments not to be one of 
outright belief, this might be an attractive possibility. For others, such a change 
would simply mean that the sceptics have won. 
 
                                                     
47 Perhaps as an act of service to the general philosophical community – or perhaps more in the 
way one supports a sports team. 
48 Cf. van Fraassen’s notion of scientific acceptance as the belief in the empirical adequacy of a 
theory (1980). 
49 I have in mind here the ‘ameliorative metaphysics’ advanced by Sally Haslanger (2000, 2005, 
2012); cf. Burgess and Plunkett 2013 and Plunkett and Burgess 2013. 
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